Christopher’s post Butler’s Ethics and Non-Reflective Subjects indeed raises very interesting questions which pushed me to think and re-think some Butlerian ideas and notions discussed in our first session.
First of all, I’ somewhat struggling with the idea of self-reflexivity brought about in Christopher’s post, since I’m wondering whether Butler doesn’t precisely suggest that the opaque subject is prevented from knowing oneself through self-reflection. In fact, it seems to me that if we do must recognize our opacity—in order to avoid any enlightenment-like universalistic aspirations—the act of self-reflection paradoxically appears to be turned more toward the other than toward the self in order to acknowledge the necessary differences between each subject. If it doesn’t, than the subject is indeed caught in a transparent self-knowledge, thereby in fact erasing any trace of opacity. So, it seems to me that ‘self-reflection’ is eventually not directed toward ourselves (in fact, our regime of truth constantly prevents us from thoroughly knowing ourselves) but toward our direct environment. This is confirmed by Butler when she states that the act of giving an account of oneself can only happen within scenes of address, in which the act of giving an account of oneself –which is to some extend also an act of self-reflection—must necessarily and forcefully be directed towards at least one addressee (GAAO 32-33).
So, it appears to me that subjects who have been defined as pathologized in advance are not necessarily prevented from recognizing their opacity, as the recognition of one’s opacity might well not entirely depend on self-reflexivity. In fact, it even seems to me that these subjects might be the ones par excellence being in state of acknowledging this opacity, probably feeling as no other how people must relate to each-other in their differences rather than in their identical qualities. So, the way we use to treat them and to look at them already gives away our difficulty to get rid of a transparent vision of subjecthood. And this makes me join Micheala’s suggestion that the subject who has been pre-defined as pathologized is not necessarily unable to give an account of himself/herself, but might rather be prohibited from giving an account of himself/herself through our pre-determined and somewhat transparent definitions of their state of being.
The remaining question is again directed to ourselves, namely: Are we really capable of getting rid of the idea of transparency left a.o. by Enlightenment and Romantic thinking? And what consequences does it have on our social and political system to fully embrace the opaque subject? (Could we still build on an institutionalized society for instance?)
Great post Marie!
ReplyDeleteThis question with which you leave us is indeed very interesting and reminds me of something Christopher notices about Butler's text.
He writes, "I do not wish to reduce Butler’s treatment of the subject to a “pure opacity” or that we cannot ever know ourselves at all, but rather, there is a part of ourselves that is formed outside the self".
I also understand Butler's arguments regarding the opaque subject in this way.
Presumably, in some sort of ideal world, a "full embrace" of the opaque subject would dictate total and constant deferment of judgment (where subjects never stop forming, and thus, can never be fully defined (be subject to 'judgment')).
I hesitate, however, to suggest Butler is so 'utopian' in her own writing. I think instead, she leaves some political room to maneuver by arguing that 'parts' of the subject are opaque.
In one of her essays (maybe "Critically Queer" Bodies that Matter), Butler outlines this idea of the 'necessary error (of identity)'. Although perhaps it might be critically responsible (so to speak) to question/challenge the regimes of truth which shape our subjectivity, sometimes it is imperative that we claim certain pre-existing subjectivities to have some claim to legal (and otherwise) rights.
I suppose what I'm suggesting is that maybe it isn't the institutions that enact transparency themselves, but rather the regulatory discourses which often accompany those institutions. As an example:
I'm thinking if a group like the American Psychiatric Association where to remain, but perhaps not rely on the DSM volumes (diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders) to 'diagnose' (read: judge) subjects. Instead, the institution could reform to provide a space for deliberation of subjectivity rather then judgment of subjectivity.
Clearly this example is a stretch, but I think it gets us toward thinking about your question about embracing this idea of "the opaque subject" concretely.